ARPS Media - Pragmatism over principle: What drives the post-2018 Ethiopia

The Horn of Africa has long been a place of contradictions: a geostrategic crossroads of global trade and a turbulent panorama of internal strife. Every year, up to 40,000 ships travel through the Red Sea corridor, transporting 40% of the world’s oil supply and approximately $700 billion in commodities. This crucial global commerce corridor, which transports more than 12% of global trade and two-thirds of trade commodities between Asia and Europe, has become a battleground for regional and global major powers vying for military bases and national interests. However, beneath this maritime highway is a complex web of “interconnected regional security complexes,” in which domestic moves by one player unavoidably send shockwaves across the boundaries of its neighbours. The growing connection between Ethiopia, the world’s most populous landlocked nation, and the de facto state of Somaliland is at the centre of today’s dynamic.

For three decades, the relationship between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa was peaceful and friendly, thanks to Ethiopia’s pragmatic “recognize in practice, not in name” policy towards Somaliland. A stable Somaliland gave Ethiopia with a security buffer and trade access, while Hargeisa benefited from a powerful friend who viewed it as a functional sovereign even as the rest of the world looked away. However, since 2018, this “exemplary” relationship has undergone a significant transition. Driven by Ethiopia’s foreign policy reorientation towards Somalia and the following urgent demand for sea access, as well as Somaliland’s existential need for de jure recognition, the two have embarked on a high-stakes diplomatic gamble that is redrawing the geopolitical geography of northeast Africa. The 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) inked by these two actors has not only rewritten their bilateral playbook, but has also sent shockwaves through a region.

The roots of a strategic partnership

The formal amicable political connections between Ethiopia and Somaliland began in 1991, when the de facto state declared independence and entered regional politics. Before regaining independence in 1991, Somaliland (the former British protectorate of Somaliland) gained independence in 1960 and, after five days of enjoying freedom, merged with former Italian colonial part of Somalia to become the Republic of Somalia. The interactions began pleasantly and remained so as Ethiopia, one of the 35 states that officially recognized Somalilands five-day independence, continued to support Somalilanders’ anti-Mogadishu regime nationalistic struggle. As a result, Ethiopia, which is at odds with the Republic of Somalia over its irredentist ‘Greater Somalian goal’, and the Somali National Movement (SNM), which was fighting against Somaliland’s persecution and marginalization in the republic of Somalia, used the enemy of my enemy is my friend policy to kick start their bilateral relations.

Following Somaliland’s rebirth in 1991, Ethiopia became the first African nation to open a consulate in Hargeisa, which was raised to an embassy-level mission in 2006. Somaliland, despite its lack of worldwide recognition, operated with its own passport, currency, and military, providing Ethiopia with a stable alternative to the anarchy in Southern Somalia. Maintaining Somaliland’s stability was critical to Ethiopia’s national security. The tranquil border served as a deterrent to extremist and terrorist groups from Somalia. Ethiopia was also perceives as crucial partner in Somaliland’s foreign policy, providing the most likely path to the international recognition it so urgently sought.

The Abiy era: policy shifts and friction

The rise of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018 first shattered this long-standing partnership. Abiy’s early foreign policy, guided by a vision of “uniting the Horn,” prioritized formal state-to-state relations with the federal government in Mogadishu. This change and adoption of a “non-intervention” policy in Somalia’s domestic affairs resulted in a cooling of ties with Hargeisa. Early efforts to prioritize regional integration and Somalia’s reunification strained relations with Somaliland, as Hargeisa was skeptical of Ethiopia’s newfound goodwill towards the federal administration in Mogadishu.

Tensions rose further when Ethiopia went into tripartite agreements with Eritrea and the federal government of Somalia, which Somaliland regarded as an attempt to force it back into a union it had long refused. This was aggravated by Ethiopia’s hosting of the anti-Somaliland Clan Conference in 2022. The diplomatic iceberg prompted Somaliland to employ “balance of power” strategies, reaching out to Ethiopia’s regional competitors, most notably Egypt. As a result, Hargeisa welcomed high-level Egyptian delegations to negotiate trade and even a prospective military base, putting Ethiopia in the most vulnerable geopolitical position: its battle with Cairo over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

The 2024 Memorandum: A new realism

Since Ethiopia became landlocked following Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1991, Ethiopia’s foreign policy approach to the port has been one of widening choices to develop the Ethiopian economy, resulting in competition among neighbouring countries to convince Ethiopia to utilize their ports. As a result, the Ethiopian government in 1991 accepted the country’s landlocked status and made no efforts to rebuild Ethiopia as an international water partner. It saw the port as simply a service or a commodity that could be purchased and used. After 2018, however, the issue received increasing attention and securitization, and subsequently a policy of having access to the sea, controlling a port that Ethiopia could administer, and becoming a naval power was implemented.

The breakthrough, and the accompanying regional firestorm, occurred on January 1, 2024, with the signing of a historic Memorandum of Understanding. Somaliland agreed to lease Ethiopia 20 km of its coastline for 50 years to establish a naval base and commercial port. In exchange, Ethiopia offered a “in-depth review” of Somaliland’s de facto recognition, as well as a stake in the state-owned Ethiopian Airlines. This MoU represented the ultimate alignment of both actors national interests. Ethiopia needed to quench its “three-decade thirst” for autonomous sea access in order to ensure its economic future, security, and join the Red Sea Forum. Meanwhile, Somaliland is using its single genuine asset-its geostrategic location-to overcome diplomatic isolation and gain de jure recognition.

Regional backlash and the “Pandora’s Box”

The MoU’s bilateral “give-and-take” has revived old ghosts. The Republic of Somalia, which views the MoU as a violation of its territorial integrity, has retaliated by forming a military alliance with Egypt and Eritrea. The advent of Egyptian weapons and troops in Mogadishu in late 2024 demonstrates how rapidly local disputes can turn into larger proxy warfare. Furthermore, large powers with established military bases in the region frequently prefer the status quo; they distrust a strong, newly maritime Ethiopia, fearing it will organize regional governments to challenge their control over the Red Sea routes.

Some regional and continental actors increased their anti-MoU pressure over time. The opposition’s fundamental argument is based on the “Pandora’s Box” theory, which states that recognizing Somaliland will spark a wave of secessionist claims across Africa. However, the 2024 MoU contradicts this by establishing Somaliland’s claim in history. Proponents say that Somaliland is not a “new” breakaway entity, but rather recovering the borders it had when it was decolonized from Britain in 1960-a stance that is congruent with the African Union’s own colonial border policy. Under tremendous international pressure, Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration in December 2024, negotiated by Turkey, to end immediate hostilities. While this agreement recognized Ethiopia’s “legitimate sea access concerns,” it notably overlooked the conditions of the Somaliland MoU, creating seeds of future difficulty.

The Ankara agreement reminds Somaliland of its vulnerability to the whims of greater countries. For Ethiopia, which has experienced significant pressure from the Arab League, the AU, and foreign allies, it reflects a tactical retreat rather than a surrender of its maritime goals. It also left the status of the Ethio-Somaliland MoU unclear, planting the seeds of future trouble. The Ankara peace deal remained contentious because it did not reverse the MoU, and Somaliland remains the most viable path to Ethiopia’s future access to the sea dream, not only because of its democratic culture and stability, but also because of its people’s genuine positive attitude towards Ethiopia and the public support Ethiopia enjoys there. Despite the MoU, the two countries continued to reset and reaffirm their bilateral connections, with Somalia’s president visiting Addis Ababa in October 2025 and Ethiopia’s high delegation visiting Hargeissa in December to enhance bilateral trade, investment potential, and economic relations.

Conclusion: The path forward

The Horn of Africa’s post-2018 dynamics depict a region undergoing substantial restructuring. Domestic forces in Ethiopia and Somaliland, as well as external regional and global concerns, have all had a significant impact on their interactions. The traditional status quo of benign neglect towards Somaliland is no longer sustainable for Ethiopia, which desperately needs access to sea and diversification of ports. Ultimately, the goal should be “economic interconnection” that goes beyond security concerns. Strengthening connections through medical tourism-which currently brings Ethiopia $20 million per year from Somalilanders-and cross-border investment could provide a more durable foundation for peace than any military alliance. The Horn of Africa is at a crossroads: it can either continue its cycle of mutual destabilization or embrace a future in which access to the sea and the right to statehood are negotiated not via the barrel of a gun, but through the common quest of regional integration.

Ethiopia’s maritime access aspiration gains legitimacy if achieved through cooperative, rules-based regionalism rather than unilateral or sovereignty-challenging activities. To do so, it should sell its shared vision to its neighbours while also leveraging its socioeconomic, security, and diplomatic advantages, such as its growing economy and larger market, infrastructure development, strategic position in the region, military and security influence, diplomatic influence as the continent’s diplomatic hub, and regional leadership role. Above all, promoting regional economic integration benefits both states and maintains peaceful relations.

Source: Newswire @ Pragmatism over principle: What drives the post-2018 Ethiopia–Somaliland relations? | Geeska