In his lecture on US-China rivalry and its implications for the Indo-Pacific, organised by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Professor Neil DeVotta began with an exposition on The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Paul Kennedy’s superb work on the trajectory of empires, the reasons for their rise and their later decline. DeVotta noted that Kennedy’s work came as a counter to the narratives that were being peddled by American political and foreign policy elites during the Reagan presidency.
Whether the US has ever recovered from its decline or whether it has come to terms with the reality of decline is debatable. DeVotta reflected on China and asked the other million dollar question: whether Beijing is facing a similar decline today and what must be done about it. He stated that it would be madness for the US and China to not sort out their differences but contended that without a fundamental shift in how both countries in particular China – operate, it will be difficult to restore equilibrium in world order.
Two events made possible China’s re-entry to the international order and its growth as a power: President Richard Nixon’s visit in 1972 and the collapse of the Soviet Union 20 years later. However vague the connection was, these two were linked.
At the time of the Nixon visit, from a realist perspective, it made sense for Washington to play off one country against the other. The US has been careful not to engage in conflict with two powers at the same time. This is something the Biden administration, with its power moves against Russia and China, did not grasp and it is something the Trump administration, with its mixed signals on both countries, seems to be reversing course on.
DeVotta argued that China’s subsequent lurch would not have been possible without the US opening doors for it, particularly in trade. This is true and it is also valid for India: without George Bush’s intervention vis-à-vis the 2008 Civil Nuclear Agreement, that country would not have got a stamp of approval from the West.
The George W. Bush administration took great care to foster relationships, pick and choose allies and ensure their stability against a changing global security and economic landscape. For the US itself, the India card proved useful on two fronts: Pakistan and China. By 2008, it no longer saw Pakistan as a dependable ally in the region and it was becoming wary of China’s meteoric rise.
DeVotta argued that at a certain point, empires face the prospect of decay and the only way to set about it is by changing internal structures. This is true for the US and it is true in the current context, at least in DeVotta’s view, for China. He concluded by speculating that China’s domestic structures may change and that it would be madness for either the US or China to pick a war over anything – trade, Taiwan, even the Indo-Pacific.
Here, common sense would dictate that Washington ensures its standing in the world today by projecting a positive, benign image of itself vis-à-vis China and countries banding together for an alternative vision of world order, BRICS being just one example.
For all its faults, the Biden administration went to great lengths to ensure this, whether in Ukraine or China, through a combination of economic, political and military manoeuvres. It failed disastrously in Gaza; to this date, one wonders what benefits Washington saw in supporting Benjamin Netanyahu, despite the many reports of atrocities and allegations of genocide but in other respects projected itself well in terms of optics.
This approach is exactly the opposite of what the Trump administration is doing and for better or worse; defenders of the US, who could earlier justify their defence with Washington’s advocacy of human rights, freedom of expression and democratic governance are at a loss. Any review of US-China rivalry must factor in that development.
The recent US National Security Strategy, which more than one foreign policy analyst has described as bizarre or unwieldy, shows how crucial it is to approach US foreign policy from a totally new and different angle. The rules of the past no longer fit; to ignore this point would be to try fitting a square peg in a round hole.
I do not think China is facing decline. Given what Washington is doing in its own backyard, the world needs a strong China as a counterbalance, whatever opinion one may have of its internal structures. Critics of authoritarianism in countries like China would do well to note that the US itself took a long, hard road to embrace democracy in full and even now has not fully got there.
Recent developments, especially regarding immigration policies, suggest that the country seems to be reversing course on what progress it has achieved on these fronts. I still agree that the US offers freedom of expression and gives carte blanche for intellectuals and scholars. But given the turmoil US universities are going through now, it is no longer possible to speak of the US in relation to China, Russia or even India with the criteria of the past. The old democracy-autocracy axis, which defenders of the US and critics of its rivals used to invoke, no longer holds water and is no longer as valid as it once was.
We are a long way away from the unipolar moment. Washington always acted as though it had never passed. What makes the Trump administration so unique is that it acknowledges that it passed. What it is now trying to do is bring it back: whatever costs that may bring, for itself and for the rest of the world.
Source: Open Newswire @ Exploring US-China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific – Groundviews
